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Bernard Williams’ books demand an unusual amount of work from readers. This is 
particularly true of his 1985 magnum opus, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (ELP)—a 
work so charged with ideas that there seems to be nothing more to say, and yet at the same 
time so pared-down and tersely argued that there seems to be nothing left to take away. 
Reflecting on the book five years after its publication, Williams writes that it is centrally 
concerned with a Nietzschean question: the question of philosophy’s authority, in 
particular when it comes to telling us how to live (1990, p. XIX). Some ethical theories 
seem implicitly committed to the idea that philosophy has everything to tell us about how 
to live. This Williams rejects. But the question then is how much philosophy has to tell us, 
and as critical as Williams may be of philosophy’s ambitions in this regard, his answer in 
ELP is certainly not nothing. The book even suggests some things that philosophy might 
say. But what Williams emphatically insists on, both in the book and in his later reflection 
on it, is that the question needs to be taken more seriously than it has been. 
Given the difficulty of Williams’ still under-explored book, the appearance of Ethics 
Beyond the Limits, a collection of new essays on ELP edited by Sophie Grace Chappell and 
Marcel van Ackeren, is particularly welcome. The collection grew out of a conference 
devoted to reflecting on the book not five, but thirty years after its appearance. Yet the 
pieces do not feel too occasional, and together they are remarkably successful in drawing 
out and disentangling the book’s different themes. Also included is a reprint of Adrian W. 
Moore’s authoritative chapter-by-chapter summary of ELP, a useful aide-mémoire for 
those already familiar with the book, but an invaluable resource for newcomers, because 
it alerts readers to the extreme density of Williams’ deceptively simple prose. (I remember 
my own incredulity when, consulting Moore’s summary, I realized just how much I had 
managed to miss on my first reading of ELP’s brief opening chapter.) In this as in other 
respects a thoughtful assembly of many of ELP’s most illuminating commentators and 
critics, Ethics Beyond the Limits is set to become an indispensable companion volume to 
Williams’ challenging classic. 
 In the opening contribution to the volume, ‘Lonely in Littlemore: confidence in Ethics 
 
 
 
and the Limits of Philosophy’, Simon Blackburn indicates how ELP might have profited 
from drawing more on the Scottish sentimentalists, particularly Hume and Smith. Writing 
about the ‘confidence’ that sustains our use of thick concepts according to Williams, 
Blackburn argues that we should look to Humean vindicatory genealogies to strengthen 
that confidence. Genealogical reflection can not only explain, but also justify the practice 
of using a concept by showing how that practice helps us avoid what anyone would want 
to avoid, such as insecurity, violence, and chaos. ‘If initially you are inclined to think of 
property as theft, or of promises as hot air, the Humean genealogy of each stands in your 
way’, Blackburn writes, and these genealogies can boost your ‘confidence that we don’t just 
happen to do those things, but that they are adaptive and that we would be poorer without 
them’ (p. 34). Had ELP been more sensitive to the vindicatory potential of genealogies in 
a Humean vein, Blackburn suggests, the book might have been less slash-burn-uproot-
and-sow-with-salt in its approach to the morality system. That would have been an 
improvement in Blackburn’s eyes, because he shares the Scotsmen’s ‘sound and grounded 
and decent confidence in the core morality system’ (p. 35), and points to Peter Strawson as 
someone who has more recently shown that blame and other components of the morality 
system ‘are not disposable add-ons, making a peculiar and parochial practice called “the 
morality system”, which we might do well to be without’ (pp. 33–34). Of course, as 
Blackburn is well aware, Williams himself later harnessed the confidence-boosting power 
of vindicatory genealogies in Truth and Truthfulness (2002), offering a genealogy that 
precisely aimed to strengthen our confidence in our intrinsic valuing of truth. In its 
employment of a fictional ‘State of Nature’ and in its vindicatory upshot, moreover, that 
genealogy might be thought to owe more to Hume’s genealogies than to Nietzsche’s 
historical and predominantly critical genealogies—although a detailed comparison of the 
genealogical methods of Hume, Nietzsche, and Williams reveals a complex web of 
interconnections (Queloz 2021). But even in ELP, one might note in Williams’ defence, 
there are thumbnail sketches of vindicatory genealogies of the conceptual building-blocks 
of the morality system. In Chapter 10, for example, he offers an initially vindicatory 
explanation of why it makes good sense for human beings to develop the concept of 
obligation for various purposes, and he points out, in a similarly conciliatory spirit, that 
the institution of blame can work coherently to the extent that it attempts less than the 
morality system demands of it. This suggests that ‘the morality system’ refers, not to any 
 
 
 
ethical consciousness articulated in terms of ideas of obligation, voluntariness, blame, and 
guilt, but to a particular elaboration and configuration of these ideas, which may well have 
taken more benign forms before they were harnessed and pressed into a specially 
demanding shape by the morality system. Williams writes: 
In order to see around the intimidating structure that morality has made out of the idea 
of obligation, we need an account of what obligations are when they are rightly seen as 
merely one kind of ethical consideration among others. This account will help to lead 
us away from morality’s special notion of moral obligation, and eventually out of the 
morality system altogether. (ELP, p. 202) 
Part of what Williams invites us to do in ELP, then, is to step out of the system by 
recovering alternative and notably less demanding conceptions of obligation, 
voluntariness, blame, and guilt. So not only do we find vindicatory genealogies 
strengthening confidence in Williams’ work; we also find them in the right places to meet 
Blackburn’s second concern, that we ought not to jettison the building-blocks of the 
morality system altogether. 
In ‘Hume’s optimism and Williams’s pessimism: from “Science of Man” to genealogical 
critique’, Paul Russell pursues the question of Williams’ relationship to Hume. During a 
seminar in Leuven in 1998, Williams declared that he used to have great admiration for 
Hume, but that he had come to think of Hume as suffering from a ‘somewhat terminal 
degree of optimism’ (1999, p. 256). Russell carefully teases out the various respects in which 
Williams indeed came to diverge from Hume, but also shows that this gradual distancing 
falls far short of complete repudiation. Where Hume betrays an optimism that sets him 
apart from Williams is in clinging to the hope that reflection on morality would deliver 
good news, and that the virtuous could be assured of their safety from fortune’s play. 
Hume, less impressed than Williams by moral diversity, was markedly more confident that 
genealogical reflection on our values would present them in a flattering light and reveal a 
connection between virtue and happiness. And yet, as Russell is able to show using a 
detailed taxonomy of the morality system, if we sort philosophers into advocates and 
critics of that system, Hume must still be counted firmly among the critics. 
Marcel van Ackeren, in his ‘Williams (on) doing history of philosophy: a case study on 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy’, examines Williams’ use of the history of philosophy in 
 
 
 
ELP. Part of the point of drawing on ancient Greek philosophy and Kant in the way that 
Williams does, van Ackeren argues, is to achieve an alienation effect: to make the familiar 
seem strange and the strange familiar. The voices of past philosophers which can precisely 
not be heard as contributing to contemporary debates alert us to the unquestioned 
assumptions these debates rest on, thereby allowing us to critically distance ourselves from 
these assumptions and to familiarise ourselves with genuine alternatives to them. That is 
the salutary effect of philosophy that is untimely, as Nietzsche put it. Using ancient Greek 
philosophy in particular, ELP invites us to change the fundamental questions we ask about 
ethical issues. Socrates’ question, ‘How should one live?’, is offered as an alternative to the 
Kantian question, ‘What should I do?’. This ancient question, which Williams also renders 
as ‘How has one most reason to live?’, asks not just after the moral obligations that bear on 
my voluntary actions, but invites all kinds of considerations. This makes the Kantian 
question look narrow-minded and shows up its questionable presuppositions. As van 
Ackeren brings out, this use of the history of philosophy differs both from the dialogue 
model whereby the voices of yore are treated as having something to say to us now and 
from the antiquarian approach whereby the figures of the past are situated within their 
own historical setting and not treated as answering our present questions at all. Van 
Ackeren then also contrasts ELP’s use of history to achieve an alienation effect with 
Williams’ later method of genealogy. While both uses of history trace back to Nietzsche 
and aim to reveal the contingency of our present conceptual framework, van Ackeren 
argues, the alienation effect can be achieved without genealogizing and constitutes a 
method in its own right. On this basis, he advocates a ‘methodological pluralism’ 
according to which the alienation effect and genealogy can take their place in our 
methodological repertoire alongside the dialogue model and the antiquarian approach. 
In ‘The good life and the unity of the virtues: some reflections upon Williams on 
Aristotle’, Anthony Price then takes a closer look at Williams’ relation to Aristotle in 
particular. First, Price labours to bring out some respects in which Aristotle is perhaps 
closer to Williams than the latter allows, in particular in their shared conviction that 
philosophy should not start from the amoralist, but from people who are already within 
the ethical life. Second, Price argues that although Aristotle’s ergon argument may look 
like an attempt to find external reasons for virtue, it can be made compatible with 
Williams’ internalism about reasons by casting it as an argument to the effect that even the 
 
 
 
vicious have some natural inclination to act virtuously. Where Aristotle and Williams 
prove irreconcilable, according to Price, is with regard to the thesis of the unity of the 
virtues, which Price proceeds to defend against Williams’ criticism. 
 In ‘Humanism and cruelty in Williams’, Lorenzo Greco draws on a wide range of texts 
to argue that a key to Williams’ view of the role of ethics in politics is the importance he 
attributes to cruelty and suffering: a fundamental problem of politics is the human 
vulnerability to suffering at the hands of others, and a fundamental ethical solution to that 
problem is the human sentimental receptivity to suffering. By engaging people’s 
imaginative capacities and rendering them more sensitive to the individuality of specific 
persons, Greco argues, this receptivity can be extended, and this is one reason why 
Williams advocated the practice of philosophy as a humanistic discipline that draws on 
other disciplines to foster a better understanding of human beings. But viewing Williams’ 
oeuvre through the lens of suffering also reveals an under-appreciated facet of his 
humanism, Greco contends—a humanism centred on human beings’ exposure and 
sensitivity to cruelty.  
Sophie Grace Chappell’s contribution, ‘Beauty, duty, and booty: an essay in ethical 
reappropriation’, takes up a line of thought that ELP labours to make room for but never 
gets around to developing, namely the idea that besides moral normativity, there is also 
aesthetic normativity. (In interviews, Williams often mentioned his early interest in 
conflicts between the aesthetic and the moral and in the artist as antinomian figure.) As 
Chappell notes in her densely argued and rich discussion, aesthetic normativity differs 
from moral normativity in several respects: it tends to be less demanding than moral 
normativity; it does not claim to override every other kind of demand in the way that 
moral demands claim to do; and it is not categorical. But besides guiding our passive 
seeing, feeling, and judging, aesthetic normativity can nonetheless also guide our actions, 
in particular when we produce rather than consume art. Our own society may place most 
people in the passive role of consuming art produced only by a few, but the balance in 
older societies was more favourable to aesthetic agency and its norms (while Hume wrote 
‘Of the Standard of Taste’ and Kant Kritik der Urteilskraft, Aristotle still wrote Peri 
Poietikes). On the Neo-Aristotelian picture that Chappell develops, aesthetic normativity 
is the normativity of a particular technê, subordinated to other technai in a hierarchy 
whose overall end is the living of a good life. If aesthetic normativity is thus subordinated 
 
 
 
to ends that are less conditional than those of aesthetic pursuits, it is no surprise that it 
should be less demanding, overriding, and categorical than the normativity that flows 
from ends we necessarily and indispensably pursue. But Chappell then seeks to recuperate 
or reappropriate from ancient Greek thought the idea that to kalon—the beautiful—can 
also be a reason for action outside artistic practice. We sometimes go for the beautiful 
gesture because it is beautiful, and refrain from doing something because it is an ugly thing 
to do. And Chappell suggests that aesthetic normativity is also woven more broadly into 
ideas of noble, fine, admirable, and virtuous action. The duty to do the virtuous thing does 
not always derive from the eudaimonic benefits it brings. As Chappell puts it, duty can 
arise from beauty as well as booty. 
In ‘Gauguin’s lucky escape: moral luck and the morality system’, Gerald Lang takes a 
fresh look at Williams’ essay on moral luck and works through six different interpretations 
of the famous Gauguin example before considering how Williams’ thoughts on moral luck 
inform his assault on the morality system. The import of the Gauguin case for ELP’s 
critique of the morality system, Lang argues, is that it illustrates how practical necessity, 
which the morality system encourages us to understand exclusively in terms of moral 
obligation, can also take a non-moral form while nonetheless expressing a justifiable 
concern. Moreover, since it is a matter of luck whether Gauguin ends up being 
blameworthy for acting on this practical necessity—it is contingent upon whether he 
succeeds as a painter—the morality system leaves us vulnerable to moral luck despite its 
promise to the contrary. On Lang’s view, the Gauguin case thus functions as a Trojan horse, 
taking an idea the morality system regards as central to itself, and using it to undermine 
the system from within. 
Geraldine Ng examines Williams’ relativism in her ‘The irrelativism of distance’. On the 
common interpretation of Williams’ ‘relativism of distance’, Ng argues, moral appraisal is 
appropriate only in real confrontations with another social world and inappropriate in 
merely notional confrontations (where a real confrontation is one with a system of beliefs 
that is a real option for one in the sense that one could go over to it). But is this the right 
interpretation of the real/notional distinction? On the ‘uncommon interpretation’ that Ng 
proposes, a clue to a better interpretation is Williams’ remark that ‘to stand in merely 
notional confrontation is to lack the relation to our concerns that alone gives any point or 
substance to appraisal’ (1981, p. 142). On Ng’s interpretation, that relation to our concerns 
 
 
 
is not a matter of ‘going over’ to another way of life, but of having an informed 
understanding of and genuinely caring about the way of life in question. Once the 
relativism of distance is recast in these moral-psychological terms, we can say of the 
eponymous character in Jim Jarmusch’s Ghost Dog, for example, that pace Williams, Ghost 
Dog’s concerns are such that the ethos of the medieval samurai is a real option for him, in 
the sense that it is one he can genuinely and authentically adopt. With the focus thus 
shifted to questions of authenticity, it would be interesting to connect this reading back to 
Williams’ discussion of stable concerns, integrity, and authenticity in Truth and 
Truthfulness. 
Continuing the theme of relativism and moral appraisal across time, Regina Rini argues 
in ‘Epoch relativism and our moral hopelessness’ that just as we often condemn past 
practices as monstrous, our distant descendants will likely come to see us as morally 
hopeless. This realization gives us reason to endorse something like Williams’ relativism 
of distance, Rini claims, because when forced to choose between the belief that we are 
morally hopeless in the eyes of future people and the belief that there are objective moral 
truths that hold across time, we should abandon the latter. This argument is modelled on 
Williams’ remarks about the ‘queasy liberal’ (2005, p. 67) who is made uncomfortable by 
liberalism’s implication that all the people in the past who failed to be liberals must have 
been poorly informed, superstitious, stupid, or bad. Realizing that this is a foolish thing to 
think about most people who ever lived, the liberal is driven either to doubt the truth of 
liberalism or to abandon the universalist belief that liberalism, if correct, must apply to 
everyone. And just as Williams urges liberals to give up the universalist belief in view of 
the moral diversity of the past, Rini urges us to give up the belief in timeless objective 
moral truths in view of our anticipated condemnation by future people. 
 In ‘The inevitability of inauthenticity: Bernard Williams and practical alienation’, 
Nicholas Smyth forcefully questions whether Williams, even in his purportedly 
vindicatory and confidence-strengthening reflections in Truth and Truthfulness, ever 
managed to put back in its box the scepticism about ethics that he unleashed in ELP. 
Smyth argues that the kind of practical alienation from our own projects and values that 
Williams accused ethical theories of engendering is in fact inevitable. Even Williams’ own 
later reflections on the value of the dispositions of accuracy and sincerity end up 
instrumentalizing these dispositions and alienating us from them. This notably weakens 
 
 
 
Williams’ critique of ethical theories by leaving him vulnerable to a companion in guilt 
argument. But, as Smyth himself asks in closing: ‘What would non-alienating reflection on 
our values look like, and would we even want such a thing?’ (p. 204). Perhaps the real 
problem, when all our values are seen inevitably to fail to meet a certain standard, is not 
so much with our values as with the standard we bring to bear on them. 
 Roger Teichmann, in ‘How should one live? Williams on practical deliberation and 
reasons for acting’, critically examines Williams’ picture of practical deliberation and 
reasons for action. In particular, Teichmann takes issue with Williams’ claim that ‘desiring 
to do something is of course a reason for doing it’ (ELP, p. 21). Teichmann’s argument is 
that in deliberating about whether to do something, one is ipso facto deliberating whether 
to desire to do it, and therefore one’s deliberation must not, except in special cases, take 
one’s desire as given (a truly paralyzing pattern of argument if allowed to apply equally to 
each successive link in the chain of reasons supporting one’s desire to do anything). 
Teichmann then moves to consider Williams’ internalism about reasons and traces it to a 
type of causalism, namely the view that actions can only be explained by appealing to their 
efficient causes. Finding this causalist thesis untenable, Teichmann concludes that we 
should reject the Williamsian picture of reasons for action and its concomitant 
subordination of practical reason to subjective desire, and that if we do so, the Aristotelian 
project of grounding the ethical life in a notion of human well-being looks more promising 
than Williams allows. 
 Similar themes are addressed in David Cockburn’s contribution, ‘Practical deliberation 
and the first person’. Against a view of ethics as something essentially impersonal, 
Williams insisted that practical deliberation was radically first-personal: while 
deliberation about what I should believe can equally well take the form of asking what 
anyone should believe, deliberation about what I should do does not admit of the same 
substitution. Cockburn considers and casts doubt on various elaborations of that claim. It 
is implausible, for instance, to maintain that all reasons for actions involve some form of 
self-reference: neither I nor my valuings and desires need explicitly figure in the reasons 
functioning as premises in my practical syllogisms at all. So is Williams’ claim perhaps 
that I must figure, not in the premises, but in the conclusion to my practical reasoning? 
Only if we suppose that the conclusion to a piece of practical reasoning must be a 
judgement, Cockburn maintains; if we allow that the conclusion might take the form of an 
 
 
 
action, there need be no sense in which that action involves reference to me. And perhaps 
we should even say that ‘I ought to do it’ expresses rather than reports my stance towards 
an action, so that it is no more a statement about me than doing something is. Rather than 
focus on the alleged first-personal character of practical deliberation, Cockburn 
concludes, we should focus on the respects in which it is second- and inter-personal. But 
one wonders whether Williams was not getting at a different idea—one that has less to do 
with self-reference than with bringing one’s personal attachments, concerns, and loyalties 
to bear on practical deliberation. When constructing a scientific theory about the world, 
bringing my personal attachments to bear would be a distortion to be avoided, as the 
theory is only incidentally constructed from my perspective, and should, if true, be the 
same for other people. But in practical deliberation, bringing my personal attachments, 
concerns, and loyalties to bear is surely not a distortion, since the evaluation is not just 
incidentally mine. As Williams puts it in ‘The Point of View of the Universe’: ‘my life, my 
action, is quite irreducibly mine, and to require that it is at best a derivative conclusion 
that it should be lived from the perspective that happens to be mine is an extraordinary 
misunderstanding’ (1995, p. 170). 
 Finally, Catherine Wilson, in ‘Moral authority and the limits of philosophy’, tackles one 
of the main themes of ELP, namely the question of how much moral authority ethical 
theories should be granted over our lives. She reconstructs Williams’ case against ethical 
theories as an argument to the effect that ethical theories will lack authority over us insofar 
as they fail to tie in with our motivations in the right way. Kantianism or utilitarianism are 
in this respect like Owen Wingrave’s father in Williams’ well-known example, marshalling 
reasons that Owen simply does not have it in him to recognize as reasons for him. But this 
leads Wilson to wonder how morality can continue to perform its function of protecting 
the weak from the strong once Williams’ argument is widely internalized. In particular, 
Williams’ scepticism towards ethical theory’s categorical authority gives rise to what 
Wilson calls the ‘exceptionalist threat’: someone might conclude that given their 
extraordinary motivational set, morality does not apply to them. Seeking to defuse that 
threat on Williams’ behalf, Wilson proposes that even without ethical theories, we can still 
identify and avoid wrongdoing by looking to the best condemnatory or vindicatory 
narratives that we could tell in thick but truthful terms. Confidently making a moral 
assessment then involves being confident that our value-laden narrative of what happened 
 
 
 
cannot be superseded by a better countervailing narrative. On this account, we can still 
claim to ‘have made genuine epistemic progress in abandoning the tribal and class-based 
perspectives of our ancestors and taking on more generous forms of altruism’ (p. 246), for 
the moral terms we today are disposed to use in telling such an evaluative narrative differ 
from those of the ancient world. Admittedly, Wilson notes, they do so partly as a result of 
the interventions of the likes of Kant or Bentham, who contributed to making us see ‘what 
was wrong and limited in ancient ethics, its pride and indifference to the weak and the 
numerous’ (p. 246). But what Williams compellingly argues, according to Wilson, is that 
even the best evaluative narratives we can now tell, historically indebted as they may be to 
supposedly aperspectival ethical theorizing, remain tied to our perspectives and draw 
their authority from their connection to our internal reasons. 
 It will be clear even from this brief overview that ELP continues to offer many 
rewarding veins to mine. But it was not always obvious that this would be so. Confronted 
in an interview with the routinely raised objection that ELP was a ‘ferociously destructive’ 
and purely ‘negative’ work, Williams responded: 
I don’t see it as negative, I see it hopefully as liberating. It seems to me people get 
themselves in situations in which they feel they have no right to have certain kinds of 
moral thoughts because they don’t fit in with some very impoverished theoretical 
picture of what constitutes moral thought. Roughly, if it isn’t about obligation or 
consequences, it doesn’t count. That’s not the way most people think most of the time 
about most things. (Davies 1996, p. 15) 
In view of Williams’ hope for his book to prove liberating, Ethics Beyond the Limits is aptly 
titled, and judging by the breadth, curiosity, and adventurousness displayed by the essays 
in this new collection, that hope has not been in vain. 
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